Enhancing Secrecy Rate Region for Recent Messages for a Slotted Multiple
  Access Wiretap Channel to Shannon Capacity Region by Shah, Shahid M. & Sharma, Vinod
ar
X
iv
:1
50
5.
02
08
5v
3 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
5 J
an
 20
17
1
Enhancing Secrecy Rate Region for Recent
Messages for a Slotted Multiple Access
Wiretap Channel to Shannon Capacity Region
Shahid M Shah, Student Member, IEEE,
and Vinod Sharma, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract
Security constraint results in rate-loss in wiretap channels. In this paper we propose a coding scheme
for two user Multiple Access Channel with Wiretap (MAC-WT), where previous messages are used as
a key to enhance the secrecy rates of both the users until we achieve the usual capacity region of a
Multiple Access Channel (MAC) without the wiretapper (Shannon capacity region). With this scheme
all the messages transmitted in the recent past are secure with respect to all the information of the
eavesdropper till now. To achieve this goal we introduce secret key buffers at both the users, as well
as at the legitimate receiver (Bob). Finally we consider a fading MAC-WT and show that with this
coding/decoding scheme we can achieve the capacity region of a fading MAC (in ergodic sense).
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Wyner in his seminal paper [1] on a degraded wiretap channel proved that by assigning
multiple codewords to a single message, we can achieve reliability as well as security in a point
to point channel. He characterized secrecy capacity for this channel. After a couple of decades of
this work when wireless revolution began, researchers started extending Wyner’s coding scheme
(wiretap coding) in different directions. A single user fading wiretap channel was studied in [2],
[3]. A secret key buffer was used in [4] to mitigate the fluctuations in the secrecy capacity due
to variations in the channel gain with time.
A multiple access channel with security constraints was studied in [5] and [6]. In [5] the
transmitting users treat each other as eavesdroppers and an achievable secrecy rate region is
characterized. In some special cases the secrecy capacity region is also found. In [6] the authors
consider the eavesdropper to be listening at the receiving end. The authors provide an achievable
secrecy-rate region. The secrecy-capacity region is not known for such a MAC. The same authors
also studied a fading MAC with full channel state information (CSI) of Eve known at the
transmitters. In [7] this work is extended to the case when the CSI of Eve is not known at the
transmitters. For a detailed review on information theoretic security, see [8], [9], and [10].
In all these works a notion of weak secrecy was used, i.e., if W is the message transmitted and
Eve receives Zn for a codeword of length n channel uses, then I(W ;Zn)/n → 0, as n → ∞.
This notion of secrecy is not stringent enough in various cases [9]. Maurer in [11] proposed a
notion of strong secrecy: I(W ;Zn) → 0 as n → ∞. For a point to point channel, he showed
that it can be achieved without any change in secrecy capacity. Since then other methods have
been proposed for achieving strong secrecy [12], [13] and [14]. The methods of [12] and [14]
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3have been used to obtain strong secrecy for a MAC-WT in [15] and [16] respectively.
In all these works we observe that security is achieved at the cost of transmission rate. For a
single user AWGN wiretap channel if Cb is the capacity of the legitimate receiver (Bob) and Ce is
the capacity of Eve’s channel, then the secrecy capacity of this channel is Cs = (Cb−Ce)+, where
(x)+ = max(0, x) ([17]). In recent years some work has been done to mitigate the secrecy-rate
loss. Feedback channel is used in [18] and [19] to enhance the secrecy rate, and under certain
conditions the authors prove that the secrecy capacity can approach the main channel capacity.
In [20] the authors assume that the transmitter (Alice) and Bob have access to a secret key, and
then they propose a coding scheme which utilizes that key to enhance the secrecy rate. Secure
Multiplex scheme has been proposed in [21] which achieves Shannon channel capacity for a
point to point wiretap channel. In this model multiple messages are transmitted. The authors
show that the mutual information of the currently transmitted message with respect to (w.r.t.) all
the information received by Eve goes to zero as the codeword length n→∞.
Shah et al. in [22] propose a simple coding scheme, without any feedback channel or access
to some key, and enhance the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel to the Shannon capacity
of the main channel. In this work also, only the message currently being transmitted is secure
w.r.t. all the information possessed by Eve. In [23] we extended the coding scheme of [22] to a
multiple access wiretap channel and showed that we can achieve Shannon capacity region of the
MAC as the secrecy rate region, while keeping currently transmitted message secure w.r.t. all the
information of Eve. In this paper we extend the coding/decoding schemes of [22] and [23] to a
multiple access wiretap channel and prove that we can achieve Shannon capacity region of the
MAC as the secrecy-rate region while keeping all recent messages secure w.r.t. the information
possessed by Eve till present. Finally we achieve the same for a fading MAC-WT.
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4Rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 1 we define the channel model and recall
some previous results which will be used in this paper. We extend our coding/decoding scheme
of [22] to two user discrete memoryless MAC-WT (DM-MAC-WT) in Section 2 and prove the
achievability of Shannon capacity region, under the security constraint that only the currently
transmitted message is secured w.r.t. all the data received by Eve. In Section 3 we consider a
two user DM-MAC-WT where each user, receiver, as well as Eve have infinite length buffers
to store previous messages. We propose a coding scheme to enhance the secrecy-rate region to
Shannon capacity region of the usual MAC, this time with security constraint that all recent
messages are secure w.r.t. all the information possessed by Eve. In Section 4 we consider a
two user fading MAC-WT and extend the coding scheme of previous sections to enhance the
secrecy-rate region of the fading MAC-WT to the Shannon Capacity region of the MAC in the
ergodic sense. Section 5 concludes the paper. The Appendix at the end contains several lemmas
used in the proofs of the main theorems.
In this paper random variables will be denoted by capital letters X, Y, Z etc., vectors will
be denoted with upperbar letters, e.g., X = (X1, . . . , Xn), scalar constants will be denoted by
lower case letters a, b etc.
1. MULTIPLE ACCESS WIRETAP CHANNEL
A discrete memoryless multiple access channel with a wiretapper and two users is considered
(Fig. 1). The channel is represented by transition probability matrix p(y, z|x1, x2) where xi ∈ Xi,
is the channel input from user i, i = 1, 2, y ∈ Y is the channel output to Bob and z ∈ Z is the
channel output to Eve. The sets X1,X2,Y ,Z are finite. The two users want to send messages
W (1) and W (2) to Bob reliably, while keeping Eve ignorant about the messages.
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Fig. 1. Discrete Memoryless Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
Definition 1.1. For a MAC-WT, a (2nR1, 2nR2, n) codebook consists of (1) message sets W(1) and
W(2) of cardinality 2nR1 and 2nR2 , (2) messages W (1) and W (2), which are uniformly distributed
over the corresponding message sets W(1) and W(2) and are independent of each other, (3) two
stochastic encoders,
fi :W
(i) → X ni , i = 1, 2, (1)
and (4) a decoder at Bob,
g : Yn →W(1) ×W(2). (2)
The decoded messages are denoted by (Ŵ (1), Ŵ (2)).
The average probability of error at Bob is
P (n)e , P
{(
Ŵ (1), Ŵ (2)
)
6=
(
W (1),W (2)
)}
, (3)
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6and leakage rate at Eve is
R
(n)
L =
1
n
I(W (1),W (2);Zn). (4)
Leakage Rate: In [6] the authors have defined two types of security requirements depending
upon the trust of the transmitting users on each other. If each user is conservative such that
when the other user is transmitting then it may compromise with Eve and provide Eve with its
codeword, then individual leakage constraints
R
(n)
L,1 =
1
n
I(W (1);Zn|X
(2)
), (5)
R
(n)
L,2 =
1
n
I(W (2);Zn|X
(1)
), (6)
are relevant, where X(i) denotes the codeword for user i.
In a scenario where users trust each other, collective leakage
R
(n)
L =
1
n
I(W (1),W (2);Zn). (7)
is relevant. Since, W (1) ⊥W (2) and hence also X(1) ⊥ X(2) where X ⊥ Y denotes that random
variable X is independent of Y ,
nR
(n)
L = I(W
(1),W (2);Zn)
= I(W (1);Zn) + I(W (2);Zn|W (1))
= H(W (1))−H(W (1)|Zn) +H(W (2))−H(W (2)|Zn,W (1))
≤ H(W (1)|Xn2 )−H(W
(1)|Zn, Xn2 ) +H(W
(2)|Xn1 )−H(W
(2)|Zn, Xn1 )
= I(W (1);Zn|Xn2 ) + I(W
(2);Zn|Xn1 )
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7= nR
(n)
L,1 + nR
(n)
L,2 (8)
and hence, if individual leakage rates are small then so is the collective leakage rate. In this
paper we consider the secrecy notion (7).
Definition 1.2. The secrecy-rates (R1, R2) are achievable if there exists a sequence of codes
(2nR1, 2nR2 , n) with P (n)e → 0 as n→∞ and
lim sup
n→∞
R
(n)
L,i = 0, for i = 1, 2. (9)
The secrecy-capacity region is the closure of the convex hull of achievable secrecy-rate pairs
(R1, R2).
In [6], a coding scheme to obtain the following rate region was proposed.
Theorem 1.1. Rates (R1, R2) are achievable with lim supn→∞R
(n)
L,i = 0, i = 1, 2, if there exist
independent random variables (X1, X2) as channel inputs satisfying
R1 < I(X1; Y |X2)− I(X1;Z),
R2 < I(X2; Y |X1)− I(X2;Z),
R1 +R2 < I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1;Z)− I(X2;Z), (10)
where Y and Z are the corresponding symbols received by Bob and Eve. 
The secrecy capacity region for a MAC-WT is not known. If the secrecy constraint is not
there then the capacity region for a MAC is obtained from the convex closure of the regions in
July 12, 2018 DRAFT
8Theorem 1 without the terms I(Xi;Z), i = 1, 2 on the right side of (10) (Fig.2) [24]. In the
next section we show that we can attain the capacity region of a MAC even when some secrecy
constraints are satisfied.
I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z)
I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z)
I(X1;Y |X2)
I(X2;Y |X1)
R1
R2
Fig. 2. Capacity region and Secrecy Rate region of MAC
2. ENHANCING THE SECRECY-RATE REGION OF MAC-WT
In this section we extend the coding-decoding scheme of [22] for a point-to-point channel to
enhance the achievable secrecy rates for a MAC-WT. We recall that in [22] the system is slotted
with a slot consisting of n channel uses. The first message is transmitted by using the wiretap
code of [1] in slot 1. In the next slot we use the message transmitted in slot 1 as a key along with
wiretap code and transmit two messages in that slot (keeping the number of channel uses same).
Hence the secrecy-rate gets doubled. We continue to use the message transmitted in the previous
slot as a key and wiretap coding, increasing the transmission rate till we achieve a secrecy rate
equal to the main channel capacity. From then onwards we use only the previous message as
key and no wiretap coding. This scheme guarantees that the message which is currently being
DRAFT July 12, 2018
9transmitted is secure w.r.t. all the Eve’s outputs, i.e., if message Wk is transmitted in slot k then
1
n
I(Wk;Z1, . . . , Zk)→ 0, (11)
as the codeword length n→∞, where Z i is the data received by Eve in slot i.
In the following, not only we extend this coding scheme to a MAC-WT but also modify it
so that it can be used to improve its secrecy criterion (11) and for fading channels as well. The
secrecy criterion used is the following: If user i transmits message W (i)k in slot k, we need
I(W
(1)
l ,W
(2)
l ;Z1, . . . , Zk) ≤ nǫ, for l = 1, . . . , k, (12)
for any given ǫ > 0. This will be strengthened to strong secrecy, I(W (1)l ,W
(2)
l ;Z1, . . . , Zk) →
0 as n → ∞ at the end of the section (See the next section for further strengthening of their
criteria). We modify message sets and encoders and decoders with respect to Section 1 as follows.
Each slot has n channel uses and is divided into two parts. The first part has n1 channel uses
and the second n2, n1 + n2 = n. The message sets are W(i) = {1, . . . , 2n1R
s
i } for users i = 1, 2,
where (Rs1, Rs2) satisfy (10) for some (X1, X2). The encoders have two parts for both users,
f s1 :W
(1) → X n11 , f
d
1 :W
(1) ×K1 → X
n2
1 (13)
f s2 :W
(2) → X n12 , f
d
2 :W
(2) ×K2 → X
n2
2 , (14)
where Xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, 2, and Ki, i = 1, 2 are the sets of secret keys generated for the respective
user, f si , i = 1, 2 are the wiretap encoders corresponding to each user as in [6] and f di , i = 1, 2
are the usual deterministic encoders corresponding to each user in the usual MAC. User i may
transmit multiple messages from W(i) in a slot. In the first part of each slot of n1 length, one
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message from W(i) may be transmitted using wiretap coding via f si (denoted by W
(i)
k,1 in slot
k) and in the second part multiple messages from W(i) may be transmitted (denoted by W (i)k,2)
using messages transmitted in previous slots as keys. The overall message transmitted in slot k
by user i is W (i)k = (W
(i)
k,1,W
(i)
k,2).
The following is our main result.
Theorem 2.1. The secrecy-rate region satisfying (12) is the usual MAC region without Eve, i.e.,
it is the closure of convex hull of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 < I(X1; Y |X2),
R2 < I(X2; Y |X1),
R1 +R2 < I(X1, X2; Y ), (15)
for some independent random variables X1, X2.
Proof: We fix distributions pX1 , pX2 . Initially we take n1 = n2 = n/2. In slot 1, user i
selects message W(i)1 ∈ W(i) to be transmitted confidentially in the first part of the slot, while
the second part is not used. Both the users use the wiretap coding scheme of [6]. Hence the rate
pair (R1, R2) satisfies (10) and R(n)L,i ≤ n1ǫ, i = 1, 2. In slot 2, the two users select two messages
each, (W (1)2,1,W
(1)
2,2) and (W
(2)
2,1,W
(2)
2,2) to be transmitted. Both users use the wiretap coding scheme
(as in [6]) for the first part of the message, i.e., (W (1)2,1,W
(2)
2,1), and for the second part user i
first takes XOR of W (i)2,2 with the previous message, i.e., W
(i)
2,2 ⊕W
(i)
1 . This XORed message
is transmitted over the MAC-WT using a usual MAC coding scheme ([24], [25]). Hence the
secure rate achievable in both parts of slot 2 satisfies (10) for both the users. This is also the
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overall rate of slot 2.
In slot 3, in the first part the rate satisfies (10) via wiretap coding. But in the second part we
XOR with W (i)2 and are able to send two messages and hence double the rate of (10) (assuming
2(R1, R2) via (10) is within the range of (15)). We continue like this (Fig 3).
Define
λ1 ,
⌈
I(X1; Y |X2)
I(X1; Y |X2)− I(X1;Z)
⌉
, (16)
where ⌈x⌉ is the smallest integer ≥ x. In slot λ1 +1 the rate of user 1 in the second part of the
slot satisfies,
R1 ≤ min (λ1 (I(X1; Y |X2)− I(X1;Z)) , I(X1; Y |X2))
= I(X1; Y |X2). (17)
Similarly we define λ2 as
λ2 ,
⌈
I(X2; Y |X1)
I(X2; Y |X1)− I(X2;Z)
⌉
. (18)
In slot λ2 + 1, the rate R2 satisfies
R2 ≤ I(X2; Y |X1). (19)
In slot λ = max{λ1, λ2}+ 1, the sum-rate will satisfy
R1 +R2 ≤ min
{
λ
[
I(X1, X2; Y )−
2∑
i=1
I(Xi;Z)
]
, I(X1, X2; Y )
}
. (20)
After some slot, say, λ∗ > λ, the sum-rate will get saturated by sum-capacity term, i.e.,
July 12, 2018 DRAFT
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(R1, R2) (R1, R2)(R1, R2)(R1, R2)(2R1, 2R2)
(R1, R2)(R
∗
1
, R∗
2
)
Fig. 3. Coding Scheme to achieve Shannon Capacity region in MAC
I(X1, X2; Y ), and hence thereafter the rate pair (R1, R2) , (R∗1, R∗2) in the second part of
the slot will be at a boundary point of (15) and the overall rate for the slot is the average in the
first part and the second part of the slot.
In slot k, (where k > λ∗) to transmit a message pair (W (1)k ,W
(2)
k ), where W
(i)
k = (W
(i)
k,1,W
(i)
k,2),
i = 1, 2, we use wiretap coding for (W (1)k,1,W
(2)
k,1) and for the second part, we XOR it with the
previous message i.e., W (i)k,2 ⊕ W
(i)
k−1,2, i = 1, 2, and transmit the overall codeword over the
MAC-WT. (Fig. 3)
To get the overall rate of a slot close to that in (15), we make n2 = ln1. By taking l large
enough, we can come arbitrarily close to the boundary of (15).
For this coding scheme, P ne → 0. A convex combination of the rates in (15) can be obtained
by time sharing. Now we show that our coding/decoding scheme also satisfies (12).
Leakage Rate Analysis: Before we proceed, we define the notation to be used here. For user
i, the codeword sent in slot k will be represented by X(i)k . Correspondingly, X
(i)
k,1 and X
(i)
k,2 will
represent n1-length and n2-length codewords of user i in slot k. When we consider i to be 1
or 2, i¯ will be taken as 2 or 1 respectively. In slot k, the noisy codeword received by Eve is
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Zk ≡ (Zk,1, Zk,2), where Zk,1 is the sequence corresponding to the wiretap coding part and Zk,2
is corresponding to the XOR part (in which the previous message is used as a key).
In slot 1, since wiretap coding of [6] is employed, the leakage rate satisfies,
I(W
(1)
1 ;Z1|X
(2)
1 ) ≤ n1ǫ, I(W
(2)
1 ;Z1|X
(1)
1 ) ≤ n1ǫ. (21)
For slot 2 we show, for user 1,
I(W
(1)
1 ;Z1, Z2|X
(2)
2 ) ≤ n1ǫ,
I(W
(1)
2 ;Z1, Z2|X
(1)
2 ) ≤ n1ǫ. (22)
Similarly one can show for user 2.
We first note that
I(W
(1)
1 ;Z1, Z2|X
(2)
2 )
= I(W
(1)
1 ;Z1) + I(W
(1)
1 ;Z2|Z1, X
(2)
2 )
(a)
≤ n1ǫ+H(W
(1)
1 |Z1, X
(2)
2 )−H(W
(1)
1 |Z1, X
(2)
2 , Z2)
(b)
= n1ǫ+H(W
(1)
1 |Z1)−H(W
(1)
1 |Z1) = n1ǫ. (23)
where (a) follows from wiretap coding and (b) follows by the fact that X(2)2 ⊥ (W
(1)
1 , Z1), and
(X
(2)
2 , Z2) ⊥ (W
(1)
1 , Z1).
Next consider
I(W
(1)
2 ;Z1, Z2|X
(2)
2 )
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= I(W
(1)
2,1,W
(1)
2,2;Z1, Z2|X
(2)
2 )
= I(W
(1)
2,1;Z1, Z2|X
(2)
2 ) + I(W
(1)
2,2;Z1, Z2|X
(2)
2 ,W
(1)
2,1)
, I1 + I2. (24)
We get upper bounds on I1 and I2. The first term,
I1 = I(W
(1)
2,1;Z1, Z2|X
(2)
2 )
= I(W
(1)
2,1;Z1, Z2,1, Z2,2|X
(2)
2 )
= I(W
(1)
2,1;Z1|X
(2)
2 ) + I(W
(1)
2,1;Z2,1|X
(2)
2 , Z1)
+ I(W
(1)
2,1;Z2,2|X
(2)
2 , Z1, Z2,1)
(a)
= 0 + I(W
(1)
2,1;Z2,1|X
(2)
2,1, X
(2)
2,2, Z1) + I(W
(1)
2,1;Z2,2|X
(2)
2 , Z1, Z2,1)
, I11 + I12, (25)
where (a) follows because Z1 ⊥ (W
(1)
21 , X
(2)
2 ). Furthermore,
I11 = I(W
(1)
2,1;Z2,1|X
(2)
2,1, X
(2)
2,2, Z1)
= H(W
(1)
2,1; |X
(2)
2,1, X
(2)
2,2, Z1)−H(W
(1)
2,1; |Z2,1, X
(2)
2,1, X
(2)
2,2, Z1)
(a)
= H(W
(1)
2,1; |X
(2)
2,1)−H(W
(1)
2,1; |Z2,1, X
(2)
2,1)
= I(W
(1)
2,1;Z2,1, |X
(2)
2,1)
(b)
≤ n1ǫ, (26)
where (a) follows since (X(2)2,2, Z1) ⊥ (W
(1)
2,1, Z2,1, X
(2)
2,1) and (b) follows since the first part of
the message is encoded via the usual coding scheme for MAC-WT.
DRAFT July 12, 2018
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Also,
I12 = I(W
(1)
2,1;Z2,2|X
(2)
2 , Z1, Z2,1)
= H(W
(1)
2,1; |X
(2)
2,1, X
(2)
2,2, Z1, Z2,1)
−H(W
(1)
2,1|X
(2)
2,1, X
(2)
2,2, Z1, Z2,1, Z2,2)
(a)
= H(W
(1)
2,1; |X
(2)
2,1, Z2,1)−H(W
(1)
2,1; |X
(2)
2,1, Z2,1) = 0,
where (a) follows since (X(2)2,2, Z1, Z2,2) ⊥ (W
(1)
2,1, X
(2)
2,1, Z2,1).
From (24), (25) and (26) we have I1 = I11 + I12 ≤ n1ǫ.
Next consider,
I2 = I(W
(1)
2,2;Z1, Z2|X
(2)
2 ,W
(1)
2,1)
= I(W
(1)
2,2;Z2|X
(2)
2 ,W
(1)
2,1) + I(W
(1)
2,2;Z1|X
(2)
2 ,W
(1)
2,1, Z2). (27)
We have,
I(W
(1)
2,2;Z2|X
(2)
2 ,W
(1)
2,1)
= I(W
(1)
2,2;Z2,1|X
(2)
2 ,W
(1)
2,1) + I(W
(1)
2,2;Z2,2|X
(2)
2 ,W
(1)
2,1, Z2,1)
(a1)
= 0 + I(W
(1)
2,2;Z2,2|X
(2)
2 ,W
(1)
2,1, Z2,1)
(a2)
= I(W
(1)
2,2;Z2,2|X
(2)
2,2)
(a3)
= 0,
and (a1) follows since W
(1)
2,2 ⊥ (Z2,1, X
(2)
2 ,W
(1)
2,1); (a2) holds because (X
(2)
2,1,W
(1)
2,1) ⊥ (W
(1)
2,2, Z2,2, X
(2)
2,2);
and (a3) is true since W
(1)
2,2 ⊥ (X
(2)
2,2, Z2,2).
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Also,
I(W
(1)
2,2;Z1|X
(2)
2 ,W
(1)
2,1, Z2)
= I(W
(1)
2,2;Z1|X
(2)
2,1, X
(2)
2,2,W
(1)
2,1, Z2,1, Z2,2)
(b1)
= I(W
(1)
2,2;Z1|X
(2)
2,2, Z2,2)
(b2)
= 0,
where (b1) follows since (W
(1)
2,1, Z2,1, X
(2)
2,1) ⊥ (Z2,2, X
(2)
2,2,W
(1)
2,2, Z1)), and (b2) follows because
Z1 ⊥ (W
(1)
2,2, X
(2)
2,2, Z2,2). Hence from (27) we have I2 = 0.
From (24) we have
I(W
(1)
2 ;Z1, Z2|X
(2)
2 ) ≤ n1ǫ. (28)
Similarly one can show that
I(W
(2)
2 ;Z1, Z2|X
(1)
2 ) ≤ n1ǫ. (29)
Therefore, from (8),
I(W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
2 ;Z1, Z2)
≤ I(W
(1)
2 ;Z1, Z2|X
(2)
2 ) + I(W
(2)
2 ;Z1, Z2|X
(1)
2 ).
To prove that (12) holds for any slot, we use mathematical induction in the following lemma.
For a proof, please see [23].
Lemma 2.2. Let (12) hold for k, then it also holds for k + 1.
Remark (A note about strong secrecy). The notion of secrecy used above is weak secrecy, i.e.,
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if message W is transmitted and Eve receives Zn, then I(W ;Zn) ≤ n1ǫ. Strong Secrecy requires
that I(W ;Zn) ≤ ǫ. In single user case, if strong secrecy notion is used instead of weak secrecy,
the secrecy capacity does not change ([26]). The same result has been proved for a multiple
access channel with a wiretapper in [16] using the channel resolvability technique. In our coding
scheme of Theorem 2 if we use resolvability based coding in slot 1, and in subsequent slots use
both resolvability based coding (in the first part of the slot) and the previous message (which is
now strongly secure w.r.t. Eve) as a key in the second part of the slot, we can achieve the same
secrecy-rate region (capacity region of usual MAC without Eve), satisfying the leakage rate
lim sup
n→∞
I(W
(1)
k ,W
(2)
k ;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk) = 0, (30)
as n→∞, because in the RHS of (12), we can get ǫ instead of 2n1ǫ.
3. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS MAC-WT WITH BUFFER
Encoder 1
Encoder 2
PY,Z|X1,X2(.|.)
Bob
Eve
✲ ✲
✲✲
✲
✲
✲
✲
W
(1)
k
W
(2)
k
(Ŵ
(1)
k ,Ŵ
(2)
k )
(R
(1)
L ,R
(2)
L )
X
(1)
k
X
(2)
k
Y k
Zk
✲
✲
❄
B
(1)
k
B
(2)
k
✻
Fig. 4. Discrete Memoryless Multiple Access Wiretap Channel with secret key buffers
In this section we improve the result in Theorem 3.1 by obtaining rates (15) while enhancing
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the secrecy requirement from (12) to
I(W
(1)
k ,W
(1)
k−1,...,W
(1)
k−N1
;Z1,...,Zk|X
(2)
k ) ≤ n1ǫ,
I(W
(2)
k ,W
(2)
k−1,...,W
(1)
k−N1;Z1,...,Zk|X
(1)
k ) ≤ n1ǫ,
I(W
(1)
k ,W
(2)
k ,...,W
(1)
k−N1
,W
(2)
k−N1
;Z1,...,Zk) ≤ 2n1ǫ, (31)
where N1 can be arbitrarily large. This will satisfy the requirements of any practical system 1.
For this, we use a key buffer at each of the users and instead of using the messages transmitted
in slot (k− 1) as the key in slot k, we use the messages transmitted in slots before k−N1− 1.
Let each user has an infinite key buffer to store the key bits. The message W (i)k after trans-
mission in slot k from user i is stored in its key buffer at the end of the slot. However now in
slot k + 1 we use the oldest bits stored in its key buffer as a key in the second part of its slot.
Once certain bits from the key buffer have been used as a key, these are discarded from the key
buffer. Let B(i)k be the number of key bits in the key buffer of the ith user at the beginning of
the kth slot. Then out of this, for k ≥ λ∗, the number of key bits used in a slot by user 1 is
C1n2 (since these are used only in the second part of the slot) where C1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2), while
the total number of secret bits transmitted in the slot is C1n2 + R(1)s n1. These transmitted bits
also get stored in its key buffer at time k + 1. Similarly it holds for user 2. Thus B(i)k →∞ as
k →∞ for i = 1,2.
After some time (say N2 slots) since we are using the oldest bits in the key buffer, for k ≥ N2,
we will be using the secret key bits only from messages (W (i)1 ,W
(i)
2 ,...,W
(i)
k−N1−1
) for securing
messages (W (i)k ,W
(i)
k−1,...,W
(i)
k−N1
), for user i = 1,2 respectively. The following proof works for
1In many countries, confidential messages beyond a certain period are declassified by law.
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N1 > 0. Theorem 2.1 wa for N1 = 0.
Theorem 3.1. The secrecy-rate region (with the leakage rate constraints (31)) of a DM-MAC-WT
equals the usual Shannon capacity region (15) of the MAC.
Proof: With the proposed modification of this section to the coding-decoding scheme of
Section 3, in any slot k, the legitimate receiver is able to decode the message pair (W (1)k ,W
(2)
k )
with probability of error P (n)e → 0 as n → ∞. Also (12) along with R(n)L,i ≤ n1ǫ1,i = 1,2
continue to be satisfied, where ǫ1 > 0 will be fixed later on.
Now we consider the leakage rate. We have,
I(W
(1)
k ,W
(1)
k−1,...,W
(1)
k−N1;Z1,...,Zk|X
(2)
k )
= I(W
(1)
k,1,W
(1)
k−1,1,...,W
(1)
k−N1,1
;Z1,...,Zk|X
(2)
k )
+ I(W
(1)
k,2,W
(1)
k−1,2,...,W
(1)
k−N1,2;Z1,...,Zk|X
(2)
k ,W
(1)
k,1,...,W
(1)
k−N1,1).
(32)
From Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2 in the Appendix,
I(W
(1)
k,1,W
(1)
k−1,1,...,W
(1)
k−N1,1
;Z1,...,Zk|X
(2)
k ) ≤ n1ǫ (33)
and
I(W
(1)
k,2,W
(1)
k−1,2,...,W
(1)
k−N1,2;Z1,...,Zk|X
(2)
k ,W
(1)
k,1,...,W
(1)
k−N1,1) ≤ 6n1ǫ (34)
Thus, taking ǫ = ǫ/7, we obtain the first inequality in (31). Similarly we can show the second
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inequality.
To prove the third inequality we define W˜ (1) , (W (1)k ,W
(1)
k−1,...,W
(1)
k−N1
), W˜ (2) , (W
(2)
k ,W
(2)
k−1,...,W
(2)
k−N1
)
and Z˜ , (Z1,...,Zk), and we have
I(W˜ (1),W˜ (2);Z˜)
= I(W˜ (1);Z˜) + I(W˜ (2);Z˜|W˜ (1))
= H(W˜ (1))−H(W˜ (1)|Z˜) +H(W˜ (2))−H(W˜ (2)|Z˜,W˜ (1))
(a)
≤ H(W˜ (1)|X
(2)
k )−H(W˜
(1)|Z˜,X
(2)
k ) +H(W˜
(2)|X
(1)
k )−H(W˜
(2)|Z˜,X
(1)
k )
= I(W˜ (1);Z˜|X
(2)
k ) + I(W˜
(2);Z˜|X
(1)
k ), (35)
where (a) follows from the facts: conditioning decreases entropy, messages are independent and
a codeword is a function of the message to be transmitted. Hence, from (33) and (34)
I(W
(1)
k ,W
(2)
k ,...,W
(1)
k−N1
,W
(2)
k−N1
;Z1,...,Z
n
k ) ≤ n1ǫ. (36)
4. FADING MAC-WT
In this section we consider a two user discrete time additive white Gaussian fading channel.
If X1, X2 are the channel inputs, then Bob receives
Y = H˜1X2 + H˜2X2 +N1 (37)
and Eve receives
Z = G˜1X1 + G˜2X2 +N2, (38)
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where H˜i is the channel gain to Bob, G˜i is the channel gain to Eve and Ni has Gaussian
distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2i , i = 1,2. We assume that the random variables
H˜1, H˜2, G˜1,G˜2,N1,N2 are independent of each other. The channel is experiencing slow fad-
ing, i.e., the channel gains remain same during the transmission of the whole codeword. Let
Hi = |H˜i|
2 and Gi = |G˜i|2, i = 1,2. Average power constraint for user i is P i.
We define some notation for convenience. For H = (H1,H2), G = (G1,G2),
C1(P1(H,G)) ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
H1P1(H,G)
σ21
)
C2(P2(H,G)) ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
H2P1(H,G)
σ21
)
Ce1(P1(H,G)) ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
G1P1(H,G)
σ22 +G2P2(H,G)
)
Ce2(P2(H,G)) ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
G2P2(H,G)
σ22 +G1P1(H,G)
)
C(P1(H,G),P2(H,G)) ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
H1P1(H,G) +H2P2(H,G)
σ21
)
(39)
An achievable secrecy rate region for this channel is
Rsg(P ) = (40)

(R1,R2) :
R1 ≤ EH,G
[
(C1(P1)− C
e
1(P1))
+]
R2 ≤ EH,G
[
(C2(P2)− C
e
2(P2))
+]
R1 +R2 ≤ EH,G
[(
C(P1,P2)−
∑2
i=1C
e
i (Pi)
)+]

(41)
where P = (P 1,P 2). To achieve these rates (with Pi(H,G) ≡ P i), the transmitters need not
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know the channel states, but Bob’s receiver needs to know all Hi, Gi. We assume this in this
section.
If the channel states (H,G) are known at each of the users as well as at the receiver of Bob,
then we can improve over the rate region in (41) by making the transmit powers as functions
of (H,G):
P : H ×G→ R2+, (42)
where P = (P1,P2). Now we denote the rate region as Csf (P). We note that the secrecy capacity
region of MAC-WT (Csf (P)) is not known, but Rsf (P) ⊆ Csf (P) [27].
Now we use the coding scheme of Section 3 to the two user fading MAC-WT to enlarge the
secrecy rate region to the usual capacity region of the fading channel. Message pair (W (1)k ,W
(2)
k )
is to be transmitted confidentially by the two users over the fading MAC in slot k, and will
be stored in their respective secret key buffers at the end of the kth slot. Let B(1)k ,B
(2)
k be the
number of bits in the key buffers of users 1 and 2 respectively at the beginning of the slot k.
Let R(i)k bits be taken from the key buffer of user i to act as a secret key for transmission of
message W (i)k . The two users satisfy the long term average power constraint
limsup
k→∞
1
k
k∑
m=1
E[Pi(Hk,Gk)] ≤ P i, i = 1,2, (43)
where Hk, Gk are the channel gains in slot k and Pi(Hk,Gk) is the average power used by user
i in slot k. We need to compute Pi(H,G) and R
(i)
k ,i = 1,2 such that the resulting average rate
region (r(1),r(2)) is maximized, where
r(i) = limsup
k→∞
1
k
k∑
l=1
r
(i)
l , (44)
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r
(i)
k is the transmission rate of user i in slot k, subject to the long term respective power constraints
(43). The secrecy-rate region is computed when
Pr({H1k > G1k} ∪ {H2k > G2k}) > 0, (45)
where Pr(A) represents the probability of event A. Otherwise, the secrecy rate region is zero.
Actually we state the following theorem for Pr(Hik > Gik) > 0,i = 1,2. If it is not true for any
one i then the secrecy rate for that user is zero. For both the transmitting users, at the end of
slot k, r̂(i)k = n(l + 1)r
(i)
k bits are stored in the secret key buffer for future use as a key, where
n2 = ln1. Hence B(i)k evolves as
B
(i)
k+1 = B
(i)
k + r̂
(i)
k −R
(i)
k . (46)
where rˆ(i)k ≥ R
(i)
k and rˆ
(i)
k > R
(i)
k with positive probability Pr(Hik > Gik). Therefore, B
(i)
k →
∞ a.s. for i = 1,2.
Theorem 4.1. If Pr(Hik > Gik) > 0, i = 1,2, and all the channel gains are available at all the
transmitters, then the following long term average rates that maintain the leakage rates (31),
are achievable:
R1 ≤
1
2
EH,G[C1(P1(H))],
R2 ≤
1
2
EH,G[C2(P2(H))],
R1 +R2 ≤
1
2
EH,G[C(P1(H),P2(H))]. (47)
where P is any policy that satisfies average power constraint. If only Bob knows all the channel
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states but not the transmitters, then (R1,R2) satisfies (47) with Pi(H,G) ≡ P i, i = 1,2.
Sketch of Achievability Scheme: We use the coding-decoding scheme proposed in Section 3
with appropriate changes to account for the fading process. Assuming B(i)0 = 0, i = 1,2, user i
transmits the first time when Hik > Gik. Then it uses the usual MAC wiretap coding as proposed
in [6] in all its l + 1 mini-slots.
In the next slot (say kth) user i uses the first mini-slot for wiretap coding (if Hik > Gik for
user i) and the rest of the m mini-slots for transmission via the secret key (if Hik < Gik the first
mini-slot is not used). It uses R(i)k = min
(
B
(i)
k ,lCi(Pi(H,G)n1)
)
key bits which are removed
from the key buffer at the end of the slot. The total number of bits transmitted by user i in slot
k is
r̂
(i)
k = R
(i)
k + n1(Ci(P1(Hk,Gk))− C
e
i (Pi(Hk,Gk)))
+. (48)
These bits are stored in the key buffer at the end of the slot. Thus r̂(i)k ≥ R
(i)
k and since
Pr(Hik > Gik) > 0, i = 1,2, Pr(r̂
(i)
k > R
(i)
k ) > 0. Thus B
(i)
k →∞ a.s. for i = 1,2.
Also, as before, we can show that after some slot k ≥ N2, with an arbitrarily large probability,
the messages transmitted in slots k, k − 1,..., k −N1 will use the messages transmitted before
k−N1−1, and the rate used in the first minislot will satisfy (41) but the rate used in the second
minislot will satisfy (47). The overall rate of the slot can be made as close to (47) as we wish
by taking l large. Thus the rest of the proof to show P ne → 0 and that (31) is satisfied follows
from Theorem 3.1.
All the above results extend in strong secrecy sense as in Section 3, by using the resolvability
based coding scheme of [16] instead of usual wiretap coding for MAC-WT of [6].
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we obtain the secrecy-rate region for a slotted multiple access wiretap channel.
We show that by using the previous message as a key in the next slot we can achieve secrecy-
rate region equal to the capacity region of a MAC, if we consider the secrecy rate of individual
messages. We then extend the result to the case where an arbitrarily large number of recent
multiple messages are secure w.r.t. the information of Eve, by using the secret key buffer for
both the transmitters. Finally, we further extend our coding scheme to a fading Gaussian channel
and show that the usual Shannon capacity region can be obtained while retaining the secrecy of
the multiple messages.
APPENDIX
Lemma A.1. The following inequality is satisfied
I(W
(1)
k,1, W
(1)
k−1,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1
;Z1, ..., Zk|X
(2)
k ) ≤ n1ǫ. (49)
Proof: We have
I(W
(1)
k,1, W
(1)
k−1,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1;Z1, ..., Zk|X
(2)
k )
= I(W
(1)
k,1;Z1, ..., Zk|X
(2)
k )
+ I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Z1, ..., Zk|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1)
+ ... + I(W
(1)
k−N1,1
;Z1, ..., Zk|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, W
(1)
k−1,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1+1,1
)
, I1 + I2 + ... + IN1 (50)
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Now let us evaluate each term. Denoting the two parts of Zk by Zk,1,Zk,2, and choosing the
wiretap coding with leakage rate ≤ n1ǫ1, where ǫ1 = ǫ/N1,
I1 = I(W
(1)
k,1;Z1,1, Z1,2, ..., Zk,1, Zk,2|X
(2)
k )
= I(W
(1)
k,1;Zk,1|X
(2)
k ) + I(W
(1)
k,1;Z1, ..., Zk−1, Zk,2|X
(2)
k )
(a)
≤ n1ǫ1 + I(W
(1)
k,1;Z1, ..., Zk−1, Zk,2|X
(2)
k ,)
= n1ǫ1 +H(W
(1)
k,1|X
(2)
k )−H(W
(1)
k,1|X
(2)
k , Z1, ..., Zk−1, Zk,2)
(b)
= n1ǫ1 +H(W
(1)
k,1|X
(2)
k )−H(W
(1)
k,1|X
(2)
k ) = n1ǫ1, (51)
where (a) follows from wiretap coding and (b) follows since (Z1, ..., Zk−1, Zk,2) ⊥ (W (1)k,1 , X
(2)
k ).
Next consider I2. We have,
I2 = I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Z1, ..., Zk−1,1, Zk−1,2, Zk|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1)
= I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Zk−1,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1) + I(W
(1)
k−1,1;(Z1, ..., Zk)\Zk−1,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1)
= H(W
(1)
k−1,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1)−H(W
(1)
k−1,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1)
+ I(W
(1)
k−1,1;(Z1, ..., Zk)\Zk−1,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1)
(a)
= H(W
(1)
k−1,1)−H(W
(1)
k−1,1|Zk−1,1) + I(W
(1)
k−1,1;(Z1, ..., Zk)\Zk−1,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1)
= I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Zk−1,1)I(W
(1)
k−1,1;(Z1, ..., Zk)\Zk−1,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1)
(b)
≤ n1ǫ1 + I(W
(1)
k−1,1;(Z1,..., Zk)\Zk−1,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1)
= n1ǫ1 + I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Z1, ..., Zk−1,2, Zk|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1)
= n1ǫ1 + I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Z1..., Zk−2|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1)
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+ I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Zk, Zk−1,2|X
(2)
k ,W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1Z1, ..., Zk−2)
(c)
= n1ǫ1 + 0 + I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Zk, Zk−1,2|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1Z1, ..., Zk−2)
= n1ǫ1 + I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Zk,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1Z1, ..., Zk−2)
+ I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Zk,2, Zk−1,2|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, ..., Zk−2, Zk,1)
= n1ǫ1 +H(W
(1)
k−1,1;|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1Z1, ..., Zk−2)
−H(W
(1)
k−1,1;|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1Z1, ..., Zk−2, Zk,1)
+ I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Zk,2, Zk−1,2|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, ..., Zk−2, Zk,1)
(d)
= n1ǫ1 +H(W
(1)
k−1,1;|Zk−1,1)−H(W
(1)
k−1,1;|Zk−1,1)
+ I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Zk,2, Zk−1,2|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, ..., Zk−2, Zk,1), (52)
where (a) follows since W (1)k−1,1⊥(X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1) and (W
(1)
k−1,1, Zk−1)⊥(X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1), (b) fol-
lows from wiretap coding, (c) follows since (W (1)k−1,1, Zk−1)⊥(Z1, ..., Zk−2, X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1),
(Z1, ..., Zk−2)⊥(X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1) and (Z1, ..., Zk−1)⊥(X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1) and (d) follows since (W
(1)
k−1,1, Zk−1,1)⊥
(X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Z1, ..., Zk−2).
But,
I(W
(1)
k−1,1;Zk,2, Zk−1,2|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, ..., Zk−2, Zk,1)
=H(W
(1)
k−1,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, ..., Zk−2, Zk,1)
−H(W
(1)
k−1,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, ..., Zk−2, Zk,1, Zk,2, Zk−1,2)
(a)
=H(W
(1)
k−1,1|Zk−1,1)−H(W
(1)
k−1,1|Zk−1,1)
=0 (53)
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where (a) follows, since (W (1)k−1,1, Zk−1,1)⊥(X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Z1, ..., Zk−2, Zk,1) and (W
(1)
k−1,1, Zk−1,1)⊥
(X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, Z1, ...,Zk−2, Zk,1, Zk,2, Zk−1,2) Hence we have
I2≤n1ǫ1. (54)
One can similarly prove that Ii≤n1ǫ1 for i=3,4, ..., N1. Hence,
I(W
(1)
k,1, W
(1)
k−1,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1
;Z1, ..., Zk|X
(2)
k )≤N1nǫ1=n1ǫ. (55)
Lemma A.2. The following inequality is satisfied
I(W
(1)
k,2, W
(1)
k−1,2, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,2;Z1, ..., Zk|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1) ≤ 6n1ǫ. (56)
Proof:
I(W
(1)
k,2, W
(1)
k−1,2, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,2
;Z1, ..., Zk|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, W
(1)
k−1,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1
)
= I(W
(1)
k,2, W
(1)
k−1,2, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,2
;Z1, ..., Zk−N1−1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, W
(1)
k−1,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1
)
+ I(W
(1)
k,2, W
(1)
k−1,2, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,2
;Zk−N1 , ..., Zk|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, W
(1)
k−1,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1
, Z1, ..., Zk−N1−1)
(a)
= 0 + I(W
(1)
k,2, W
(1)
k−1,2, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,2
;Zk−N1, ..., Zk|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, W
(1)
k−1,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1
, Z1, ..., Zk−N1−1)
= I(W
(1)
k,2, W
(1)
k−1,2,..., W
(1)
k−N1,2;Zk−N1,1,..., Zk,1|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, W
(1)
k−1,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1, Z1, ..., Zk−N1−1)
+ I(W
(1)
k,2, W
(1)
k−1,2,..., W
(1)
k−N1,1
;Zk−N1,2, ..., Zk,2|X
(2)
k , W
(1)
k,1, W
(1)
k−1,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1
, Z1, ..., Zk−N1−1,
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Zk,1, Zk−1,1, ..., Zk−N1,1)
(b)
= 0 + I(W
(1)
k,2, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,2
;Zk−N1,2, ..., Zk,2|W
(1)
k,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1
, Z1, ..., Zk−N1,
Zk−N1,1, ..., Zk−1, X
(2)
k )
(c)
= I(W
(1)
k,2, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,2
;Zk−N1,2, ..., Zk,2|Z1, ..., Zk−N1, X
(2)
k )
,
= I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ2|Ẑ1, X
(2)
k ),
where (a) follows, since (W (1)k,2, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,2) ⊥ (Z1..., Zk−N1−1, W
(1)
k,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1, X
(2)
k ), (b)
follows, since (W (1)k,2, W
(1)
k−1,2, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,2) is independent of the other random variables (r.v.s)
in the first expression, (c) follows since (W (1)k,1, ..., W
(1)
k−N1,1
, Zk−N1,1, ..., Zk−1,1) is independent
of all other r.v.s in the expression, and in the last inequality we denote the respective random
sequences with their respective widehat symbols.
Now we observe that
I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ1, Ẑ2|X
(2)
k )
= I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ1|X
(2)
k ) + I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ2|Ẑ1, X
(2)
k )
(a)
= 0 + I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ2|Ẑ1, X
(2)
k )
≤ I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ1, Ẑ2|X
(2)
k )
= I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ2|X
(2)
k ) + I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ1|Ẑ2, X
(2)
k )
(b)
= 0 + I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ1|Ẑ2,X
(2)
k ) (57)
where (a) follows since Ŵ (1)2 ⊥ (Ẑ1, X
(2)
k ), and (b) follows since Ŵ
(1)
2 ⊥ (Ẑ2, X
(2)
k ).
We will also use the following notation: Ŵ (1)1 , (W
(1)
k,1, ..., W k−N1,1), Ai are the indices of
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messages transmitted in slots 1, ..., k−N1−1 that are used as secret keys by user i for transmitting
messages in slots k−N1,...,k, W
(i)
Ai
=
(
W
(i)
k , k ∈ Ai
)
, W
(i)
Ac
i
=
(
W
(i)
k , k ∈ {1, ..., k −N1 − 1}
)
,
similarly we define ZAi , ZAci . Then we have
I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ1|Ẑ2, X
(2)
k )
≤ I(Ŵ
(1)
2 , W
(1)
A1
, W
(2)
A2
;Ẑ1, |Ẑ2, X
(2)
k )
= I(W
(1)
A1
, W
(2)
A2
;Ẑ1, |X
(2)
k , Ẑ2) + I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ1|X
(2)
k , Ẑ2, W
(1)
A1
, W
(2)
A2
)
(a)
≤ I(W
(1)
A1
, W
(2)
A2
;Ẑ1) + I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ1|X
(2)
k , Ẑ2, W
(1)
A1
, W
(2)
A2
)
(b)
= I(W
(1)
A1
, W
(2)
A2
;Ẑ1) + 0
= I(W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(1)
A1,2
, W
(2)
A2,1
, W
(2)
A2,2
;Ẑ1)
= I(W
(1)
A1,1, W
(2)
A2,1;Ẑ1) + I(W
(1)
A1,2, W
(2)
A2,2;Ẑ1|W
(1)
A1,1, W
(2)
A2,1)
(c)
= I(W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(2)
A2,1
;Ẑ1) + 0
= I(W
(1)
A1,1;Ẑ1) + I(W
(2)
A2,1;Ẑ1|W
(1)
A1,1)
≤ I(W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(2)
A1,1
;Ẑ1) + I(W
(2)
A2,1
;Ẑ1|W
(1)
A1,1
)
(d)
≤ 2n1ǫ+ I(W
(2)
A2,1
;Ẑ1|W
(1)
A1,1
)
(e)
= 2n1ǫ+ I(W
(2)
A2,1;ZA2, ZAc2 |W
(1)
A1,1)
= 2n1ǫ+ I(W
(2)
A2,1
;ZA2 |W
(1)
A1,1
) + I(W
(2)
A2,1
;ZAc
2
|W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2)
,
= 2n1ǫ+ I1 + I2 (58)
where
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• (a) follows because Ẑ1 ↔ (W
(1)
A1
, W
(2)
A2
)↔ (Ẑ2, X
(2)
k )
• (b) follows since Ŵ (1)2 ↔ (W
(1)
A1
, W
(2)
A2
, Ẑ2, X
(2)
k )↔ Ẑ1
• (c) follows since (W (1)A1,2, W
(2)
A2,2) ⊥ (Ẑ1, W
(1)
A1,1, W
(2)
A2,1)
• (d),(j) and (m) follows by wiretap coding
• (e) follows since Ẑ1 = (Z1, ..., Zk−N1) = (ZA2, ZAc2)
Now we evaluate I2,
I2 = I(W
(2)
A2,1;ZAc2 |W
(1)
A1,1, ZA2)
= H(W
(2)
A2,1
|W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2)−H(W
(2)
A2,1
|W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2 , ZAc2)
(a)
= H(W
(2)
A2,1|W
(1)
A1,1, ZA2,1, ZA2,2)−H(W
(2)
A2,1|W
(1)
A1∩A2,1, ZA2,1)
(b)
= H(W
(2)
A2,1
|W
(1)
A1∩A2,1
, ZA2,1)−H(W
(2)
A2,1
|W
(1)
A1∩A2,1
, ZA2,1) = 0 (59)
where (a) and (b) follow because W (1)A1,1 and W
(1)
A1,1
are used as keys only in slots k−N1,..., k.
Next we evaluate I1,
I1 = I(W
(2)
A2,1
;ZA2 |W
(1)
A1,1
)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩A1,1, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2 |W
(1)
A1,1)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2|W
(1)
A1,1
) + +I(W
(2)
A2∩A1,1
;ZA2|W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1, 1
)
,
= I3 + I4 (60)
Now
I3 = I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2 |W
(1)
A1,1
)
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= I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2∩A1,ZA2∩Ac1 |W
(1)
A1,1)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2∩Ac1|W
(1)
A1,1
) + I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2∩A1 |W
(1)
A1,1
,ZA2∩Ac1)
,
= I31 + I32. (61)
Consider,
I31 = I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1, 1
;ZA2∩Ac1|W
(1)
A1, 1
)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1, 1
;ZA2∩Ac1, 1, ZA2∩Ac1,2|W
(1)
A1,1)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2∩Ac1,1|W
(1)
A1,1
) + I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2∩Ac1,2|W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1,1)
(a)
≤ I(W
(1)
A2∩Ac1,1
, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2∩Ac1,1) + 0
(b)
≤ 2n1ǫ, (62)
where (a) follows since ZA2∩Ac1,2 ⊥ (W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
, W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1,1), (b) follows from wiretap
coding and that W (1)A1,1 ⊥ (W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1,1). Next consider the 2
nd term of (61). We get
I32 = I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2∩A1|W
(1)
A1,1, ZA2∩Ac1)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2∩A1,1, ZA2∩A1,2|W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2∩A1,1|W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1) + I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2∩A1,2|W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1, ZA2∩A1,1)
(a)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;ZA2∩A1,1|W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1) + 0
= H(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
|W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1)−H(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
;|W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1, ZA2∩A1,1)
(b)
= H(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
|ZA2∩Ac1)−H(W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
|ZA2∩Ac1)
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= 0 (63)
where (a) follows since ZA2∩A1,2 ⊥ (W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
, W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1 , ZA2∩A1,1), (b) follows since
W
(1)
A1,1 ⊥ (W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1) and (W
(1)
A1,1, ZA2∩A1,1) ⊥ (W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
, ZA2∩Ac1).
Finally we consider
I4 = I(W
(2)
A2∩A1,1
;ZA2 |W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩A1,1
;ZA2,1, ZA2,2|W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩A1,1
;ZA2,1|W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
) + I(W
(2)
A2∩A1,1
;ZA2,2|W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
, ZA2,1)
(a)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩A1,1
;ZA2,1|W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
) + 0
= I(W
(2)
A2∩A1,1;ZA2∩A1,1, ZA2∩Ac1,1|W
(1)
A1,1, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
)
= I(W
(2)
A2∩A1,1
;ZA2∩A1,1|W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
) + I(W
(2)
A2∩A1,1
;ZA2∩Ac1,1|W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
, ZA2∩A1,1)
≤ I(W
(2)
A2∩A1,1, W
(2)
A2∩A1,1;ZA2∩A1,1|W
(1)
A1,1) +H(ZA2∩Ac1,1|W
(1)
A1,1, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
, ZA2∩A1,1)
−H(ZA2∩Ac1,1|W
(1)
A1,1
, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
, ZA2∩A1,1, W
(2)
A2∩A1,1
)
(b)
≤ 2n1ǫ+H(ZA2∩Ac1,1|W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
)−H(ZA2∩Ac1,1|W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
)
= 2n1ǫ, (64)
where (a) follows, since ZA2,2 is independent of the rest of the terms in the expression, (b) follows
because (ZA2∩Ac1,1, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
) ⊥ (W
(1)
A1,1
,ZA2∩A1,1) and (ZA2∩Ac1,1, W
(2)
A2∩Ac1,1
) ⊥ (W
(1)
A1,1
, ZA2∩A1,1, W
(2)
A2∩A1,1
).
Hence we have from (60) that I ≤ 6n1ǫ. Thus we get,
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I(Ŵ
(1)
2 ;Ẑ2|Ẑ1, X
(2)
k ) ≤ 6n1ǫ,
(65)
whence the lemma is established.
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